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Network Security is fast becoming an absolute necessity to protect the 
information contained on computer systems worldwide. The ever-changing 
scope of network use and operation along with the public concern for 
protection of sensitive information makes implementing an efficient and 
effective security plan a must. Part of such a plan.includes an approach of 
security in depth. This includes many different pieces of software and 
hardware working together to provide the desired protection. One component 
of this approach is that of network intrusion detection systems and for the 
purposes of this research, the Snort intrusion detection system will be used. 
However, to ensure that such an implementation is likely to be successful the 
system must be tested prior to implementation to provide decision makers 
with assurance to reduce risks. Making a network intrusion detection system 
work effectively should not degrade overall network performance, so some 
type of performance measurement plan must be designed and implemented. 
Such a plan is the topic of this research. The effect of using an inline 
intrusion detection system, measured by end-to-end delay introduced by the 
engine, will be discussed as a method of performance testing intrusion 
detection systems at a basic level to ensure network traffic is unaffected. 
This will provide some information as to whether the intrusion detection 
system is capable of efficiently detecting intrusions while maintaining network 
performance. 
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Network intrusion detection is becoming a key element in the total 
security approach to network protection. With the use of network intrusion 
detection systems on the increase and the growth in high volume, high-speed 
I 
networks, network administrators need to ensure that network traffic is not 
I 
being unduly delayed by overhead introduced from the inline network 
intrusion detection system. Network administrators do not want to jeopardize 
network security or add unneeded overhead to the already extremely busy 
networks by introducing an inline network detection system. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
There have been many studies done to test the performance of both 
network and host intrusion detection systems. However, in most of these 
instances the performance was based on the ability to detect intrusions and 
not on the ability of the system to ensure that continued network traffic 
performance levels are maintained when placed inline. lnline network 
intrusion detection systems obviously place some additional overhead into the 
network traffic path simply by the processing required to compare the traffic to 
the system signatures. How much overhead will be introduced into the 
network traffic by introduction of an inline network detection system and 
whether this overhead is significant needs to be determined. This paperiwill 
address the need for performance testing of an inline network intrusion 
detection system by providing a simple method of measuring network delay 
introduced by the network intrusion detection system when using the Snort 




How much overhead, measured by elapsed time or delay in network 
traffic, will be introduced by the implementation of an inline intrusion detection 
system? The null hypothesis for this question will be that the delay added by 
the inline intrusion detection system will not be noticeable. 
Question2 
Which processing options available in Snort, either individually or in 
combination, will introduce the most delay, if any, to the network traffic? The 
null hypothesis for this question will be that the processing option that 
introduces the most delay will have either Flow or Stream4 or a combination 
of both pre-processors turned on. 
Question3 
Does the introduced overhead, if any, by an inline intrusion detection 
system create a significant and practical delay in the overall end-to-end path 
of network traffic? The null hypothesis for this question will be that the delay 
introduced by an inline intrusion detection system will not be significant. 
3 
IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
Network security is a major topic of many business organizations in the 
last several years. Headlines have been full of reports concerning network 
security breaches, the spreading of malicious software, and the need for 
better security mechanisms to protect business secrets, personal information, 
and governmental interests. This has spawned a large number of hardware 
I 
appliances and software applications to provide added security for compµter 
networks. One type of software application introduced is the network 
intrusion detection system (some systems come packaged as a hardware 
appliance). These systems are touted as potentially becoming a prominent 
tool in preventing unwanted traffic from entering an administrator's network. 
Many of these network intrusion detection system vendors market their 
products as being able to process traffic at 'wire speed' indicating there is no 
delay added to the network traffic from the detection system. This has not 
been tested in the prospective customer's production network so there is, no 
indication of how the system will perform when implemented in the live 
environment. Developing a simple method of verifying the processing speed 
of the intrusion detection system then becomes quite important to assist in 
product evaluation. 
Also, as more products are made available, the customizable options 
available on these products are ever expanding. Without testing, a 
prospective customer only has the word of the vendor as to the performance 
impact of each option. Testing the system specifically for each option then 
provides valuable information assisting in product selection. Such testing 
should be completed on production traffic to ensure the results will be more 
relevant and applicable in the customer's environment. Such a simple 
method of performance testing can then be transferred to candidate intru'sion 
detection systems to be considered. 
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A final consideration is that a prime method of getting around an 
intrusion detection system is to overwhelm that system with excessive 
network traffic volume. This traffic does not have to be legitimate traffic, but 
can still make the intrusion detection system of nil effect. Testing will provide 
information indicating how much load the intrusion detection should be able to 
maintain without serious network performance degradation. This in turn will 
allow the network administrator to be proactive in upgrading or switching out 
such a system. 
Selecting an intrusion detection system that is incapable of processing 
the volume of network traffic thrown at it will lead to poor network 
performance and eventually customer satisfaction will be negatively effected. 
Testing prior to implementation of an inline network intrusion detection system 
should be mandatory for anyone looking to use such a system. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
While testing the performance of the Snort intrusion detection system 
the scope of the test is specific to certain indications of performance. Th~ test 
and performance measurements must then be controlled and should not1be 
effected by other processing components of the software. To ensure this the 
following assumptions will be made. 
Assumption 1 
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Snort is an intrusion detection system that is designed to detect 
network intrusions through both pattern matching and detection of anomalous 
network behavior. For this study, it will be assumed that Snort is capable of 
performing both functions efficiently and effectively. 
Assumption 2 
Snort can be installed and used within a few minutes of installation. 
However, there are many customizable components designed in the Snort 
system that will not be considered for this research. This study will use the 
default configuration assuming that it is sufficiently optimized for basic testing 
to determine the amount of delay or elapsed time from end-to-end traffic 
introduced by the intrusion detection system. 
Assumption 3 
It will also be assumed that the sample traffic used for testing the 
intrusion detection system will be representative of all network traffic on the 
live network of Morehead State University. 
LIMITATIONS 
As the assumptions are made to assist in controlling and focusing the 
research on the stated problem there are some known limitations to consider 
I 
as well. These limitations are being made to ensure that the data gathered 
and analyzed will be capable of answering the stated problem. 
Limitation 1 
This research will be limited to the detection engine processing 
efficiency. This efficiency will be determined by the amount of delay thatjthe 
engine introduces into the network traffic flow and will not be determined:by 
I 
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the ability to accurately detect intrusion or by inaccurately detected intru~ions. 
Limitation 2 
This study will be limited to the study of select pre-processor modules 
used by the Snort intrusion detection system. There are several such 
modules available for Snort; some have been tested and verified for 
Enterprise usage, while others are still being developed and tested. We will 
limit this study to the Flow, sfPortscan, Stream4, Frag2, Telnet_negotiation, 
and Http_inspect pre-processor modules available in Snort. 
Limitation 3 
Several different methods for alert output are also available in Snqrt. 
This study will limit the alert options to the standard default, which procel!ses 
alerts to a basic log file. The system alert output will not be reviewed for this 
study, as this information would be used to determine detection accuracy. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
For clarity of understanding the following terms will be defined. Tlile 
definitions given will be operational definitions that are pertinent to this study 
and the software used to conduct the research. 
• Intrusion - any unwanted access or attempted access to 
network resources through either malicious traffic such as 
viruses or Trojans or through intentional, directed system 
attacks. 
• Intrusion Detection - any method used to pinpoint or locate an 
intrusion on either a host machine or in network traffic. 
• Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) - an intrusion 
detection system that monitors network traffic scanning for 
anomalous behavior and matching defined patterns to detect 
intrusions. 
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• Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) - an intrusion detection 
system that runs on a host machine and detects intrusive 
behavior through monitoring and analysis of log file, security 
access policies, and user login information. 
• Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS)- an intrusion 
detection system that is a combination of both a NIDS and a 
HIDS with the analysis completed in a central location. 
• Intrusion Prevention - use of an intrusion detection system,or 
other specialized software to both monitor network traffic while 
detecting possible intrusions and is also able to dynamically 
respond to such intrusions to either block the traffic or 
quarantine such traffic. 
• Engine - the primary detection mechanism used in most 
network intrusion detection systems. The software unit reads 
I 
network traffic and compares it to defined patterns looking for 
matches indicating a possible intrusion attempt. 
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• Pre-processor Module - any software plug-in component that is 
used to enhance the effectiveness of the Snort intrusion 
detection system. These components are usually designed to 
detect a single, common attack activity and network traffic is run 
through these software components prior to running throug~ the 
primary scan engine to reduce traffic through the scan engi~e 
and improve system performance. 
• Console - the central repository of intrusion detection alerts 
used for logging, analysis, and cross-referencing multiple alert 
devices. 
• Sensor - an intrusion detection device that does not analyze 
alerts, but reports alerts to a central location for analysis and 
cross reference. Snort running on a machine reporting to a 
central console would be considered a Sensor. 
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• Stealth Mode - an operational mode of network intrusion 
detection systems used to monitor network traffic while being 
undetectable to individuals attempting intrusion. Such machines 
' 
either have one-way traffic from the outside network to the ! 
inside network or do not have a network address to allow 
communication back onto the network. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
HISTORY OF NETWORKING 
Network Growth 
IO 
Computer networking is a commonplace necessity for almost all 
organizations today as well as many homes, but did have humble begin1ings 
in the not to distant past. According to (Boswell, n.d.) computer networking 
began almost 50 years ago with a small Department of Defense agency 
called the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) which was formed in 
1957. ARPA sponsored many projects to look at sharing information in small 
telephone connected networks of computers. The first real plan was unveiled 
in 1966 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by developing small 
computer networks primarily being used by universities. This quickly began 
to grow and by the year 1987, there were over 10,000 hosts on this ever 
expanding network. This is where computer networking started becoming a 
major force in people's lives and was beginning to be referred to as the 
Internet (Boswell, n.d.). In 1988, thousands of computer hosts were infected 
by the first large-scale internet worm that caused certain individuals to begin 
looking at ways to secure the network. The World Wide Web was then 
developed in 1991 and by 1993 the growth of the World Wide Web was 
estimated at over 340,000 percent (Boswell, n.d.). With this explosive grpwth 
of computer networking and the 1988 incident, people became aware that 
security was definitely needed for continued growth. 
Network Security Concerns 
11 
The Internet worm of 1988 was a possibility because of one major flaw 
in the network as well as the connected hosts. This flaw was inherit in the 
design of all the products, software, and protocols in use up until this tim~. All 
of these items were designed with one topic in mind, functionality. Security 
and defense was the original starting point in 1957, but the development and 
progress swiftly moved to functionality and ease of use. Without 
consideration for security and no real reason to consider security up until the 
Internet worm of 1988, development continued unchanged. Security 
concerns were under study, but the majority of growth was with the network 
and personal computers, while security studies where still focusing on 
governmental uses. 
Once security was considered for general public network use there 
were many different methods developed to secure the networks and hosts 
operating over them. Specialized software for audit tracking, virus detection, 
and network based security protocols, and many others were being 
developed to prevent further incidents. Each of these options were additions 
to the host computers and existing network protocols in use. These additions 
were needed to secure these systems until the design of new host operating 
' 
systems and network protocols could be developed that would provide a more 
secure operating environment from the base up. Most of these tools we~e 
simply patches to hold things together until a better solution could be 
implemented. 
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However, during this time of transition the explosion of both the World 
Wide Web as well as the advancements made in personal computing 
hardware made it difficult to implement the needed security design being 
I 
developed because the entire networking world was evolving and changi:ng 
' 
on a daily basis. So more advanced tools began to emerge from studies and 
proposals made in the network's infancy that included many of the tools and 
utilities in use today. These tools included advanced capability networking 
hardware, intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, 
advanced auditing tools, advanced virus protection tools, firewalls, and many 
others too numerous to mention. 
Such tools are continuing to evolve to meet the ever-changing 
demands of secure network usage and in many cases these tools are being 
designed into the newer hosts and network products now emerging. Thii,; 
integration and continued growth is beginning to finally catch up with the 
every day changes occurring on the Internet and lntranets in today's 
networking world. 
Security In-Depth 
With the continued growth of possible network security flaws and the 
growing understanding and knowledge of today's malicious software 
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developer's, a single security application or tool is in most cases insufficibnt to 
I 
protect and secure a network. With this realization, a new concept has begun 
' 
to develop concerning network security. The concept of 'Security In-Depth' is 
a new trend that is occurring across the world. Security In-Depth simply 
means that the security of a computer network should occur in a deeply 
layered approach. The layers are each a specific application or tool to , 
enhance security, prevent unauthorized access, and detect unauthorized 
access. 
Such an approach should begin from the inside of an organization and 
then work outward. The first layer is the proper training of employees on the 
organization's security policies and information concerning what action the 
user should take in certain scenarios. This would be followed by the need for 
host machines to have some type of intrusion detection application on them 
as well as virus detection and grayware detection applications. Next, there 
should be some type of secure policy control on the point of network 
connection or the network switch, which should also have a slightly advahced 
I 
security policy on the uplink connection to the main router. The router s~ould 
have secure policy access control lists created and implemented to assist in 
securing the internal network. The next layer would include a firewall and 
possibly a de-militarized zone enclosed by a second firewall. The final layer 
should include a network intrusion detection or intrusion prevention system. 
Both would be nice, but often times a single application can complete bo~h 
functions. 
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This is a security in-depth approach to network security. The secyrity 
is not left to a single point of success or failure, but has a depth to it where 
each layer can assist and complement the others. This is the current trend 
and this is why a network intrusion detection system becomes important .in 
the scheme of total network security and performance. 
NETWORK SECURITY INTRUSION SYSTEMS 
Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion detection systems come in three primary forms. Network 
intrusion detection systems, host-based intrusion detection systems, and 
distributed intrusion detection systems. As discussed with the concept of 
security in-depth, an intrusion detection system is a necessary component. To 
begin with, there is the host-based system installed and operating on the host 
machines and the network intrusion detection system running on a dedic~ted 
machine to monitor network traffic, so there are two points of reference f6r 
analysis and detection of any possible intrusion. A network administrator'may 
also have a distributed intrusion detection system in operation depending on 
the size of the network, but detection is the key element in the operation of 
any of these three systems. 
Implementing any of these systems will require some type of 




overhead to the detection process, which may affect performance. Host+ 
based systems have several advantages over network intrusion detection 
systems. To begin with, host-based systems are very good at deterring and 
detecting intrusions or misuse at the point of origin when the intrusion occurs 
inside an organization (Proctor, 2001 ). Since the host-based system monitors 
the host machines or computers any anomalous behavior can be detectf!d 
much quicker than if it is originating outside the organization. There is also 
the benefit of having a much better logging system in place to assist with 
host-based intrusion detection. Almost all computer operating systems 
currently in use offer logging facilities built natively into the system. These 
logs allow the security administrator to correlate the detected intrusion against 
the log files to better understand what took place and what damage has been 
done (Proctor, 2001 ). 
Host-based systems also have some challenges to effective use. The 
most important challenge to be faced is that of performance (Proctor, 2001 ). 
' 
Since these systems are hugely distributed by design, performance 
degradation can occur on the network and at the host machine. The sen:ding 
of the monitoring traffic across the network can create network delays and the 
processing of the intrusion system agent on the host machine can create 
processing delays locally. It is estimated that a small network of 1 0 Windows 
NT servers, 5 UNIX servers, 200 Windows NT workstations, and 50 UNI~ 
workstations can generate as much as 800MB of data each day (Proctor! 
' 
2001 ). In addition to the performance issues, the management of such ~ 
distributed system can become quite difficult as the network grows. 
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In comparison, the network intrusion detection system also provides 
some advantages and disadvantages specific to the system. Network 
intrusion detection systems are better suited to preventing intrusions fro111 
outside an organization (Proctor, 2001 ). A network intrusion detection system 
' 
can monitor all the traffic coming into an organization from outside to det~ct 
possible intrusions and can also monitor all outgoing traffic to detect misuse 
from inside an organization. This type of system is much more centralized so 
that management and control are much easier and more manageable than 
with a host-based system. 
Network intrusion detection systems must also be concerned with 
performance. When operating on a high-speed network there is a very 
realistic possibility of dropping packets (Proctor, 2001 ). This occurs when the 
traffic coming into the intrusion detection system overwhelms the system. 
The system then ignores packets passing them through the system withtiut 
checking them in an attempt to keep up with the traffic volume. Adjustments 
can be made to the system to prevent it dropping any packets, which require 
that all packets are queued and checked before passing them back on to the 
network. This prevents dropped packets but can greatly affect network 
throughput performance, causing serious bottleneck delays in the traffic. 
Dropping packets can essentially make the network intrusion detection 
system ineffective. Packet reassembly can also cause delays in the 
performance on the intrusion detection application by requiring additional 
processing to scan the complete packet. Scanning fragments only can miss 
malicious traffic that is broken across those multiple fragments. 
Distributed intrusion detection systems are a combination of the host-
based systems and the network-based systems and are primarily 
implemented on larger networks. However, such systems inherit the 
advantages and disadvantages of both system types. 
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Network intrusion detection systems operate in a variety of different 
ways. However, the most common form of detection, as well as the most 
accurate, is that of network signatures (Proctor, 2001 ). These types of 
systems operate in the same manner as most virus detection applications in 
use today. The network traffic is read off the wire and compared to a group of 
known problematic traffic patterns. Most network signatures follow one of two 
forms: pattern matching within the packet contents or pattern matching ~ithin 
' 
the packet headers (Proctor, 2001 ). Even though pattern matching is the 
primary method of detection, there are other options available. The most 
common include statistical analysis (heuristics), metalanguage, and artificial 
intelligence (neural networks). Each of these types of detection mechanisms 
have had limited success, but can be extremely effective when combined with 
the signature based approach. 
Intrusion Prevention Systems 
There is a common misconception concerning the similarities andi 
differences between intrusion detection systems and intrusion prevention 
systems. The primary job any intrusion detection system has is to detect 
intrusion or misuse. Network intrusion detection systems can be 
implemented as an inline system or as a passive system. The inline system 
I 
is physically placed in the network traffic path and monitors and analyze~ all 
traffic in a real-time live setting. An intrusion prevention system is designed 
to be able to prevent an intrusion or misuse. However, to be able to prevent 
such activity the system must first be able to detect such activity. This is 
where the misunderstanding arises. A network intrusion prevention system 
must be physically placed inline to provide the best possible measure of 
intrusion prevention. 
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Many people assume that a network intrusion system placed inline is a 
network intrusion prevention system, but this is not the case. There is 
1 
' 
another primary feature difference between the two types of systems. A' 
network intrusion detection system can detect a possible intrusion and alert 
on that detected possibility as instructed, but is limited to detection 
capabilities only. A network intrusion prevention system is capable of 
detecting a possible intrusion, alerting on that intrusion, and then taking a 
predefined action to prevent that traffic from passing on the network (Pro~tor, 
2001 ). The operation of dynamic action in a network intrusion prevention 
system is the key element in differentiating the two systems. 
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This study is using a network intrusion detection system implemented 
in an inline manner. The physical design of the test network does not suggest 
that a network prevention system is being used. Network intrusion prevention 
systems in most cases have been developed from a network intrusion 
detection system and modified to add the automated response features. This 
allows prevention systems to use the same detection methods as the base 
intrusion detection systems. This allows common components to be reused 
to reduce repetitive tasks in product development. 
SNORT INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
There are many different versions of network intrusion detection 
systems with some being open source and freeware, while many others are 
commercial applications that are neither freeware or open source. Some of 
the more respected commercial applications are Enterasys' Dragon syst~m. 
Cisco's CSIDS (Cisco Secure Intrusion Detection system), and TippingPoint's 
intrusion prevention system. Enterasys and Cisco use a signature based 
approach to detection that will run on most UNIX variants, while TippingPoint 
uses a hardware solution in conjunction with custom application specific 
integrated circuits. Likewise, there are several freeware open source 
applications available that include Bro, Advanced Security audit trail Analysis 
on uniX (ASAX), Graph-based Intrusion Detection System (GrlDS}, Intrusion 
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Detection in Our Time (IDIOT}, and Snort. Of these open source systems, of 
which there are many more, Bro and Snort are the only two that are not 
research projects and these two systems operate in two distinct manners. 
Bro is an event-driven detection system, while Snort is a signature based 
detection system with modular expansion capabilities. Since signature based 
is currently the most effective method and Snort is an open source freeware 
' 
software application this is the system to be used for testing in this study.I 
Snort Capabilities 
Snort is a project that was developed to be a lightweight intrusion 
detection system for protection of small TCP/IP networks (Baker, Caswell & 
Poor, 2004). However, as Snort's use became more widespread the requests 
for enhancements and upgrades become more numerous. This led to several 
revisions of the software with major expansions to Snort's capabilities with 
each revision. Snort currently has version 3.0 Alpha available for initial 
testing, while the current production release is version 2.6.1.4. Snort is 
strictly a network intrusion detection system. However, because of the n~ed 
for dynamic intrusion response, the Snort developers created a sister product 
called Snort_lnline. Snort_lnline uses the same detection engine and offers 
the same capabilities as the basic Snort application, but also has the 
capability of operating inline. 
Snort offers many customizable features for use, as well as a modular 
design that allows specific pieces of additional software to be plugged in or 
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out depending on user need. Most of these add in modules come in the form 
of software code called pre-processors, which will be discussed a bit later, 
while the remainder come in the form of software code output modules. This 
is a great feature of Snort, which allows an extremely customizable 
application from the user's standpoint. Many of the output modules allow 
Snort to log alerts and network packets to simple log files (either in ASClli or 
binary), structure query language database formats, server message bloc;k 
alerts, and the system console. 
Snort uses a signature based detection engine as the primary method 
of detection with additional functionality added through the pre-processor 
modules. The base install comes with a certified set of signatures, but this 
set can easily be updated by the Snort administrator for emerging threats, 
which makes Snort a very scalable and manageable application. 
A final capability of Snort that makes it an ideal source for intrusion 
detection is its ability to operate either inline or passively. The base Snort 
system was taken and modified to allow the detection engine to operate as an 
intrusion prevention system. With version 2.3.0 the functionality of the 
Snort_lnline project was incorporated into the base application for Snort. This 
is where the issue of this study begins to emerge. How does running Snort 
in line affect the performance of the network, especially considering the many 
pre-processor modules that can be added to the base system? Considering 
this question the software to be used will be Snort 2.6.1.2 (Build 34). Thi~ 
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software maintains all the features of the main Snort software, while being 
modified and customized for operation inline allowing for better performance. 
Snort Pre-processors 
Snort has many pre-processors available. Some have been certified 
by the Snort project team, while others are in testing and more yet are still in 
development. These modular pre-processors are what make Snort such a 
powerful and effective intrusion detection tool. The pre-processors that we 
are primarily concerned with for this study are the Flow, sfPortscan, Stream4, 
Frag2, Telnet_negotiation, and Http_inspect. The first four pre-processors 
are designed to prevent certain types of packet traffic, while the last two pre-
processors are designed to normalize the protocol specific traffic. 
The Flow pre-processor is an important pre-processor module simply 
because it is a required component for some other modules and it is used to 
keep track of state information of TCP sessions (Baker, et al, 2004). The two 
modules requiring Flow are the Flowbits detection module and the Flow-
sf Portscan module. The Flow-sf Portscan module is a replacement for the 
sf Portscan module, but is currently still in the experimental stage of 
development and thus is not being used. 
The sfPortscan pre-processor is an early detection module. As many 
malicious intrusions begin with a network port scan to determine open and 
accessible points of entry the sf Portscan pre-processor is designed to detect 
this type of activity and alert on a possible intrusion before the intrusion 
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occurs. This module gives a good indication of possible future intrusion 
attempts, thus giving the security administrator the chance to be proactive in 
approaching this activity (Baker, et al, 2004). 
The Stream4 pre-processor is another module that is used to keep 
track of state information (Baker, et al, 2004). The primary difference 
between this module and that of the Flow pre-processor is that Stream4 is 
used to reassemble network streams. Fragmented packets from session 
streams have been one of the areas of Snort that has come under attack: 
The Stream4 module helps reduce the vulnerability of Snort to these types of 
attacks. Since packets can be reassembled and monitored by the state of the 
session, it becomes more difficult for possible intruders to inject traffic into the 
session stream. 
The Frag2 pre-processor also assists in protecting both the intrusion 
detection system as well as the network in general. Denial of service attacks 
are commonly used in fragmented packets. The intrusion detection engine 
can only scan full packets for signature matching, so a fragment containing 
potential harmful information could be passed onto the network. Frag2 
reassembles all packet fragments into a complete packet before allowing the 
information to pass through the detection engine (Baker, et al, 2004). The 
denial of service attack is also prevented because specially crafted fragments 
that carry denial of service attacks are not allowed onto the network without 
first being reassembled. 
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Telnet_negotiation is a pre-processor to normalize Telnet and Ftp 
traffic. The Telnet and Ftp protocols tell the clients and servers what services 
they each support so that the required sessions can be initiated and 
maintained. However, for Telnet, the protocol allows these service 
advertisements to be dispersed throughout the Telnet packet payload making 
it difficult to match signatures against the payload. This module removesiall 
of the Telnet negotiation codes leaving the Telnet session data (Baker, et al, 
2004). The Snort engine can then more effectively match against suspicious 
telnet content. 
Http_inspect functions are similar to the Telnet_riegotiation module. 
This module also is used to normalize network traffic. Over time the http 
protocol has evolved to the point that a simple task can be completed with 
several different versions of the same command. Depending on what web 
server is being used, the syntax changes and some servers will accept 
multiple versions of syntax. With the many different versions that will be 
accepted by servers, the detection engine can have a difficult time match,ng 
against a specific syntax when something different will perform the same 
function. Http_inspect was then designed to take any http packets and 
convert them to a standard syntax format and then use that standardized 
packet for signature matching (Baker, et al, 2004), once again increasing the 
effectiveness of Snort as an intrusion detection engine. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Snort 
Snort is a very versatile application. Due to the modular design and 
ability to add or snap in specialized software components Snort can be a 
powerful tool in a security in-depth implementation. This design allows 
anyone capable of programming to build and implement their own pre- , 
processor modules to customize Snort's operation to their specific 
environment. Customization can also be accomplished through specialized 
configurations of the existing pre-processor modules, as well as alert output 
operations. 
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Snort also has a large following and according to the Snort website 
snort.erg, Snort is the de-facto standard in intrusion detection systems. There 
are many commercialized systems available, but many organizations use 
Snort because it is an effective intrusion detection system, and it can be 
obtained at no cost. Snort is a signature based detection system and with the 
large user base new signatures are constantly being added. This large user 
and support base has led to what is described as a highly effective and 
efficient detection engine (Snort, 2007). 
Snort does have some limited shortfalls when it comes to anomaly 
detection. The system was not designed for this type of operation, but some 
pre-processor modules attempt to add this functionality. Currently these 
modules are not considered to be effective in detection. There is also 
concern about how efficient the detection engine actually is in terms of 
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processing performance. The base engine is considered to be quite efficient, 
but there is speculation as to how efficient the system becomes when used 
with the pre-processor modules. The added functionality is good, but what 
price do you have to pay for that functionality. 
CURRENT RESEARCH PROJECTS 
Network Security 
Network security has been researched for many years and will 
continue to be a key research topic until there are no network security 
breaches. According to (Puketza, 2000), there are three natural approaches 
to network security, which are: protection through filtering, protection through 
assessment, and protection through detection. This work was done to show 
that by filtering known unwanted traffic, constantly testing for unknown 
vulnerabilities, and implementing measures to detect unwanted traffic a 
network can be secured. 
One of the steps suggested by (Puketza, 2000) was the process of 
detection using an intrusion detection system. Puketza's study used Network 
Security Monitoring (NSM), which is not a true intrusion detection system1 but 
relies on components that operate like intrusion detection systems to create 
an integrated data collection and analysis suite. He considers detection one 
of the four key elements required to develop secure systems. (Puketza, 




Figure 1 - Key Elements of a Secure Network Implementation 
Considering this model of network security, we can easily see that the 
detection process is an important component. 
Intrusion Detection 
27 
(Puketza, 2000) hypothesized that a high stress load on the intrusion 
detection system may effect the system's ability to monitor and detect 
intrusions. This indicates that the intrusion detection system may becomj3 a 
point of either extreme delay or packet loss. The test for this study was 
implemented by using software tools to build a level of stress on the intrusion 
detection system and then sending the system specific intrusion attacks. The 
system was then monitored to determine how well it detected the attacks and 
at what level system resources were being used. The test did not try to 
determine how much delay the system introduced into the network path. This 
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study clearly indicated that there is a need for performance testing of intrusion 
detection systems. 
Several other studies have been completed with consideration to 
intrusion detection systems. A couple by (Chen, 2001) and (Zamboni, 2001) 
discuss the performance of intrusion detection systems. However, both of 
these studies were concerned with detection capability performance. (Chen, 
2001) suggested that the effectiveness of the intrusion detection process, 
' 
could be improved through proposed noise cancellation techniques, while 
(Zamboni, 2001) suggested the implementation of internal sensors to perform 
intrusion detection in computer systems. (Zamboni, 2001) determined that 
his proposed implementation could detect a far greater number of attempted 
intrusions. Neither study focused on the performance of the detection system 
itself. 
Performance Measurement 
The measurement of performance metrics for networking applications 
has been a topic of study since networking was initially introduced. This 
continues to be a point of study because of the ever-constant changes arid 
improvements being introduced. (Puketza, 2000) suggested that 
performance measurement, specHically for intrusion detection systems, was 
important because it gave indications into the operation of the network, as 
well as providing information that could be useful for comparative purposes 
I 
when looking at purchasing decisions. (Cisco, 2007) also suggested that 
' ' 
performance testing of a network and any applications that run on that 
network is important to ensure the proper level of service is being provided. 
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Considering performance testing of a network one of the prime 
components often used for measurement is end-to-end delay. When the end-
to-end delay increases beyond a certain point, which must be determined on 
a network by network basis, the usability and reliability of the network be~ins 
to degrade. One method of introducing delay onto a network is through 'fixed 
delay components' (Cisco, 2007). These are components that add direct!y to 
the overall delay on the network. Using a network intrusion detection system 
implemented in an inline manner could introduce fixed delay. Any component 
on the network whether it be routers, switches, or security appliances has the 
potential to introduce delay. How much delay is introduced and whether that 
value is significant or not is a question that must be answered. 
For general purpose networks that will likely carry voice, video or 
multimedia traffic, as well as basic data, there needs to be some guidelines 
established. Such guidelines have been established to assist in determin,ing 
when the delay value becomes unacceptable. Table A-1 (Appendix A) s~ows 
the established guidelines, which are the values that will be used for the 
analysis in this study. These guidelines suggest that overall per packet delay 




POPULATION AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
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To test the processing performance of the Snort intrusion detection 
system some network traffic will be needed to run through the detection 
engine. To get a better idea of how the detection engine operates in a liye 
environment this traffic should be tested in a live environment. This can pe 
quite disruptive to the network, so traffic needs to be obtained from a 
production network that can be used in a test environment. Better control of 
the testing environment can be maintained by using this type of scenario. 
To accomplish this the Morehead State University Industrial and 
Engineering Technology departmental network to be used for the population 
set and a portion of that traffic will be captured to be considered as a test 
sample. The sample will be captured using the Wireshark packet sniffer 
program. A computer that has Wireshark installed will be connected to the 
main link from this network to the main University network and will capture all 
traffic that passes on that network port in a single direction. The traffic 
direction being used for this capture will be from an off network address to the 
Industrial & Engineering Technology departmental subnet. The captured 
information will be saved in a file that will be named TestCapture.pcap. All 
experimental passes will use this file for data collection. 
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TESTING ENVIRONMENT 
There must be a laboratory setting to use for the test environment.• For 
this laboratory setting three computers will be required. The machines being 
used in this study will all be identical, with one machine having a second 
network interface card installed. The machines are IBM NetVista machines 
with Pentium 4 processors operating at 2.3 GHz, 512 MB ram, and Intel Pro 
100 VE network interface cards. Each machine will be loaded with FreeBSD 
version 6.1 and will use the KDE desktop environment version 3.5. These 
machines will be called IDSSource, IDS, and IDSDest dependent on the 
machine's purpose on the simulation network. All three machines will also 
have the Wireshark software installed. IDSSource will have the UNIX utility 
suite tcpreplay installed, while IDS will have the Snort 2.1.6.2 (Build 34) 
software installed along with the FreeBSD firewall software IPFW. Machine 
IDS will have two network interface cards installed, as it will be used for the 
network intrusion detection system engine operating in inline mode. All 
additional dependent software required for the selected packages listed will 
also be installed. 
To be able to operate inline Snort was modified to read traffic from a 
TCP port (8000 by default) instead of from a network interface card. Another 
element on the machine must then read the traffic from the network interface 
card and pass it to the TCP port being monitored by Snort. IPFW 
accomplishes this task. IPFW is a firewall program developed for FreeBSD. 
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assists in ensuring that the data being used is as close to live traffic as 
possible. The data will then leave the IDSSource machine using tcpreplay 
and it will be sent to IDSDest. However, it must cross IDS before reaching its 
destination. IDS will use IPFW to read the traffic and divert it to Snort, where 
the packet will be processed and then either dropped or passed back to 
IPFW, where it will then be forwarded on to IDSDest. Once the packet is 
received at IDSDest it will be read by the Wireshark application, which will re-
1 
I 
capture the traffic along with new timestamps for each packet received. 
IDSSource 
I TCREPLAY ~~ IDS 
~ 
IPFW Snort Intrusion 
Detection System 
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/ 
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Figure 3 - Intrusion Detection Simulated Network 
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DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 
Due to the numerous possible combinations of pre-processors tha~ 
may be used, this study will use a full-factorial experimental design. Under 
consideration are six pre-processor modules and each module can be turned 
either on or off. This indicates that there are 64 possible combinations, which 
require 64 test passes. Table A-2 (Appendix A) shows the design table with 
all possible combinations. To help ensure that unknown factors do not affect 
! 
the results, the test will be performed with eight replications. The replications 
will allow a determination of how each pre-processor module combination 
effects the total end-to-end delay of the network traffic by averaging multiple 
passes that may encounter noise effects, thus reducing the effect of the noise 
and providing more reliable results. The order of testing each combination 
will be determined on a random basis using the RAND function in Excel. 
METHOD OF MEASUREMENT 
The amount of delay introduced by the Snort intrusion detection 
system will be used as an indicator of the processing performance of the 
system. This delay will be measured as the elapsed time from receipt of ithe 
initial packet until receipt of the final packet on the machine IDSDest, as 
measured by the application Wireshark. This simulated elapsed time will then 
be compared to the elapsed time of the original traffic capture. The elapsed 
time from the original traffic capture as measured by Wireshark is 393.13!937 
seconds. This elapsed time was determined by the Wireshark applicatio!]. 
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The Wireshark application captured the initial packet and recorded this packet 
as time stamp 0:00. Each additional packet was then captured and time 
stamped. The time stamp placed on each of these packets was the amount 
of elapsed time from receipt of the first packet. The final packet captured 
recorded an elapsed time of 393.137937. The effect of the intrusion detection 
engine and associated modules will be determined by the difference of the 
measured elapsed time as described above compared to the original traffic 
time. These differences will then be collected and used for analysis. 
Once the data has been collected, an analysis will be made of the 
obtained results. To start, a statistical analysis will be performed on the 
results obtained to determine significance. Significance will give indication of 
what factors or factorial combinations have the most statistically significant 
impact on the amount of overhead introduced into the end-to-end delay QY the 
intrusion detection system. To begin with, a calculation of factor effect will be 
made, followed by a calculation of interaction effect between factors. Both 
the main effect and the interaction effect between factors will be analyzed for 
significance using analysis of variance (ANOVA). This will show what effect 
I 
each individual factor had on end-to-end delay introduced by the intrusion 
detection system. Once the main effects and interactions effects have been 
calculated ANOVA will give indication of statistical significance of any factor 
or factor interaction. 
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Statistical significance will be determined by using the pooled estimate 
of variances analysis using the SPSS software application. A confidenc~ 
interval of 95% will be used for this analysis. Significance factors calculated 
by SPSS, that are smaller than 0.05, will give indication of statistically 
significant factorial effects. 
Once statistical significance using ANOVA has been determined, a 
follow up analysis using a Tukey-Kramer method will be performed. This. 
method will perform a pair wise comparison and t-test that will give a more 
detailed indication of which treatment factor combination adds the most end-
to-end delay and which treatment factor combination has a statistically 
significant effect introduced by the Snort in line intrusion detection system. 
Once this is completed an analysis to determine practical significance 
will be completed. This will be determined using the information in Table.A-1 
(Appendix A). The total elapsed time determined for each experimental pass 
will be distributed to the individual packets being used from the file 
TestCapture.pcap by dividing the amount of time into the total number of 
packets. The total number of packets in the file TestCapture.pcap is 240\ 142. 
' 
From the file TestCapture.pcap the total elapsed time is 393.137937, so the 
per-packet processing time for this file would be 393.137937 / 240,142 or 
0.001637 seconds per packet. This per packet processing time value will be 
compared to Table A-1 to determine which values are practically significant 
and which have no practical effect. 
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Any per packet processing time value greater than 150 milliseconds 
will be considered practically significant. This is the value assumed to be the 
cutoff for noticeable network delay issues. Any elapsed time higher thanithis 
value can greatly effect multimedia applications and will be considered as 
excessive delay. Once the statistical and practical significance is determined, 
an analysis will be completed to review the results and provide answers to the 
posed ~esearch question. 
APPLICATION TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Question 1 asks how much end-to-end delay is introduced by the 
implementation of an inline intrusion detection system. The observations 
made will assist in easily determining how much additional time, compared to 
the original capture, each treatment factor introduced. Question 2 asks which 
processing options in Snort introduce the most delay. The observations 
compared to the original capture time value can be used to determine the 
amount of delay introduced by Snort. This value can then be ranked to show 
which treatment introduces the most delay. Question 3 then asks which 
treatment introduces either a statistically or practically significant delay. This 
I 
answer will be determined using the ANOVA and Tukey-Kramer post hoc 
analyses discussed earlier. 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
DATA COLLECTED 
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The raw data from the simulation environment are shown in Table C-3 
(Appendix C). This table also shows the average observation value of all test 
runs by treatment factor, along with the total average of all test runs for all 
treatment factors. 
Observations were then entered into SPSS and were analyzed. This 
information was then processed with both the SPSS ANOVA options using 
the univariate analysis of the general linear model, and where found to be 
statistically significant were further analyzed with the Tukey-Kramer post-hoc 
methodology. SPSS provides analysis for the Tukey-Kramer method, but the 
results are affected by the limitation of 3 significant decimal positions, while 
the values under analysis require 6 significant decimal positions. Therefore, a 
manual analysis of the Tukey-Kramer results was performed. The output 
from the ANOVA analysis is listed in Table D-7 (Appendix D) and the Tu~ey-
Kramer analysis results are listed in Tables D-9 through D-16 (Appendix p). 
METHOD OF ANAL VSIS 
Beginning with the raw observations and average value per run from 
Table C-3 (Appendix C) we can easily determine the amount of time 
introduced by each treatment factor, as well as the overall average from µse 
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of the lnline Intrusion Detection system. This information showing the 
average value per treatment run and the delay introduced is listed in Table C-
4 (Appendix C). The final column shows the delay introduced when 
compared to the original packet capture time of 393.137937 seconds. 
Reviewing these data shows that the time introduced by the In line 
Intrusion Detection System ranged from 0.001350 seconds to 0.001913 
seconds or from 1,350 µs to 1,913 µs. These numbers represent the total 
delay for processing the entire packet capture and are not per packet valµes. 
The average delay introduced was 0.001638 seconds or 1,638 µs. The full 
range of introduced delay sorted from highest delay to lowest delay is shown 
in Table C-5 (Appendix C). 
Now that the values for introduced delay have been analyzed, the 
matter of statistical and practical significance can be considered. 
Screenshots of the setup configuration used for the ANOVA analysis of SPSS 
are shown in Figures 8-4 through B-7 (Appendix B). Using SPSS to process 
the ANOVA analysis gave indication that the overall model is significant by 
calculating a significance factor of 0.034. The analysis also indicated th~t no 
I 
main effects and 8 interaction effects were statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level. The 8 interaction effects with significance factor are 
treatment factor 7 (sfPortscan&Stream4), treatment factor 13 
(Stream4&Frag2), treatment factor 25 (Frag2& Telnet_negotiation), treatment 
factor 36 (Flow&sfPortscan&Http_inspect), treatment factor 46 
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(Flow&Stream4&Frag2&Http_inspect), treatment factor 47 
(sf Portscan&Stream4&Frag2&Http_inspect), treatment factor 49 
(Telnet_negotiation&Http_inspect), and treatment factor 59 
(sfPortscan&Frag2&Telnet_negotiation&Http_inspect). The 8 interaction 
treatments are shown in Table D-8 (Appendix D) along with their treatment 
factor combination option mean values. An ad-hoc analysis of these 8 
treatment factors is now performed using the Tukey-Kramer pair wise 
analysis. This ad-hoc analysis is completed to assist in providing additional 
detail into the actual combinations of the significant interactions that provide 
the significant results. 
Each treatment factor is compared to the other treatment factors using 
the Tukey-Kramer method through manual comparisons to assist in 
identifying the interaction combinations that may provide the difference 
between means, leading to an indication of significance from the ANOVA 
analysis. The results of these pair wise Tukey-Kramer comparisons are listed 
for the treatment factors indicating significance in the ANOVA analysis in 
Tables D-9 through D-16 (Appendix D). The summary results of the Tukey-
' 
Kramer analysis are listed in Table D-17 (Appendix D). 
Table D-8 shows the mean values of combination differences for the 
significant treatment factor of sfPortscan&Stream4, while the Tukey-Kramer 
analysis is shown in Table D-9 with summary information in Table D-17. IThe 
pair wise comparisons show that there is a statistically significant difference in 
I 
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mean values when sf Portscan and Stream4 are both turned off compared to 
when sf Portscan is turned on and Stream4 is turned off. The P-value for this 
comparison is calculated at 0.006, which is well below the significance level of 
0.05. This gives indication that sf Portscan introduces significant delay when 
Stream4 is turned off. When Stream4 is not on and not keeping track of 
session state information, then sf Portscan must depend on itself to determine 
if port scanning is occurring. The state information provided by Stream4 
gives information on sessions from source to multiple destinations, whic~ can 
assist in detecting port scanning. sfPortscan has the greatest effect in this 
treatment factor combination. 
Table D-8 shows the mean values of combination differences for the 
significant treatment factor of Stream4&Frag2, while the Tukey-Kramer 
analysis is shown in Table D-10 with summary information in Table D-17. 
The pair wise comparisons show that there is a statistically significant 
difference in means values when Stream4 is off and Frag2 is on compared to 
when Stream4 is on and Frag2 is on at a 95% confidence factor. The p-value 
for this comparison is 0.0429. This indicates that Stream4 works much 
harder keeping track of state information when Frag2 has removed fragments 
from the packet traffic and created the uber packets for analysis. Stream4 
has the greatest effect of this treatment factor combination. 
Table D-8 shows the mean values of combination differences for the 
' 
significant treatment factor of Frag2&Telnet_negotiation, while the TukeY:-
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Kramer analysis is shown in Table D-11 with summary information in Table D-
17. The pair wise comparisons give no indication of any statistically 
significant combinations at the 95% confidence factor. For this scenario, it 
appears that the full interaction of these two treatment factors has the biggest 
effect for this significant treatment factor combination. 
Table D-8 shows the mean values of combination differences for the 
significant treatment factor of Flow&sf Portscan&Http_inspect, while the 
Tukey-Kramer analysis is shown in Table D-12 with summary informatiori in 
Table D-17. The pair wise comparisons show that there is a statistically 
significant difference in means when Flow is on, sfPortscan is off, and 
Http_ihspect is off compared to when Flow is on, sf Portscan is on, and 
Http_inspect is off at a 95% confidence factor. The p-value for this 
comparison is 0.0042. This scenario is similar to the effect seen with the 
sf Portscan&Stream4 comparisons. Since Flow does a similar work as 
Stream4, sfPortscan must depend on itself to determine if port scanning is 
occurring from a single source machine, but when Flow is on sfPortscan can 
more efficiently track source machines for scanning. sf Portscan has the : 
greatest effect of this treatment factor combination. 
Table D-8 shows the mean values of combination differences for the 
significant treatment factor of Flow&sfPortscan&Http_inspect, while the 
Tukey-Kramer analysis is shown in Table D-13 with summary informatio~ in 
Table D-17. The pair wise comparisons for this treatment factor show th~t 
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there are two statistically significant treatment factor combinations at a 95% 
confidence factor. The first comparison occurs when Flow is off, Stream4 is 
on, Frag2 is on, and Http_inspect is off compared to when Flow is on, 
Stream4 is on, Frag2 is on, and Http_inspect is off. This comparison had a p-
value of 0.0159. The second comparison occurs when Flow is on, Stream4 is 
off, Frag2 is on, and Http_inspect is off compared to when Flow is on, 
Stream4 is on, Frag2 is on, and Http_inspect is off. This comparison ha~ a p-
value of 0.0173. The common component of these two combinations occurs 
when Frag2 is on and Http_inspect is off. However, Flow and Stream4 have 
the greatest effect of this treatment factor combination. 
Table D-8 shows the mean values of combination differences for the 
significant treatment factor of sf Portscan&Stream4&Frag2&Http_inspec,t 
while the Tukey-Kramer analysis is shown in Table D-14 with summary 
information in Table D-17. The pair wise comparisons show that five 
combinations have statistically significant results at a 95% confidence factor. 
The first comparison occurs when sf Portscan is off, Stream4 is off, Frag2 is 
off, and Http_inspect is off compared to when sfPortscan is off, Stream4 !s off, 
Frag2 is off, and Http_inspect is on. This comparison had a p-value of 
0.0399. The second comparison occurs when sfPortscan is on, Stream4 is 
off, Frag2 is off, and Http_inspect is off compared to when sfPortscan is on, 
Stream4 is off, Frag2 is on, and Http_inspect is off. This comparison had a p-
' 
value of 0.0239. This comparison also had a statistically significant diffe~ence 
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in mean values when checking sub-factor comparisons. The sub-factor 
comparison occurs when sfPortscan is on, Stream4 is off, and Frag2 is off 
compared to when sfPortscan is on, Stream4 is off, andFrag2 is on. This 
comparison had a p-value of 0.0098. The third comparison occurs when 
sfPortscan is on, Stream4 is off, Frag2 is off, and Http_inspect is off 
compared to when sfPortscan is on, Stream4 is on, Frag2 is off, and 
Http_inspect is off. This comparison had a p-value of 0.0144. The sub-factor 
comparison of sfPortscan on, Stream4 off, and Frag2 off compared to when 
sf Portscan is on, Stream4 is on, andFrag2 is off also gave a statistically 
significant p-value of 0.0159. The fourth comparison occurs when sfPortscan 
is off, Stream4 is off, Frag2 is on, and Http_inspect is on compared to when 
sfPortscan is off, Stream4 is on, Frag2 is on, and Http_inspect is on. This 
comparison had a p-value of 0.00288. The final comparison occurs when 
sfPortscan is off, Stream4 is off, Frag2 is off, and Http_inspect is off 
compared to when sfPortscan is on, Stream4 is off, Frag2 is off, and 
Http_inspect is off. This comparison had a p-value of 0.0005. This 
comparison has several sub-factor comparisons, which are statistically 
significant and are listed in Table D-17. The sfPortscan pre-processor has 
the greatest effect of this treatment factor combination, but is influenced by 
both the Stream4 and Frag2 pre-processors. 
Table D-8 shows the mean values of combination differences for the 
I 
significant treatment factor of Telnet_negotiation&Http_inspect, while the: 
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Tukey-Kramer analysis is shown in Table D-15 with summary information in 
Table D-17. The pair wise comparisons show that every possible 
combination of this treatment factor is statistically significant at a 95% 
confidence factor. Telnet_negotiation off and Http_inspect off compared to 
Telnet_negotiation off and Http_inspect on has a p-value of 0.0034. 
Telnet_negotiation on and Http_inspect off compared to Telnet_negotiation 
on and Http_inspect on has a p-value of 0.0026. Telnet_negotiation off a,nd 
Http_inspect off compared to Telnet_negotiation on and Http_inspect off has 
a p-value of 0.0072. Telnet_negotiation off and Http_inspect on compared to 
Telnet_negotiation on and Http_inspect on has a p-value of 0.0012. This is 
another scenario where the interaction of the two factors creates a statistically 
significant result. 
Table D-8 shows the mean values of combination differences for the 
significant treatment factor of sfPortsan&Frag2&Telnet_negotiation& 
Http_inspect, while the Tukey-Kramer analysis is shown in Table D-16 with 
summary information in Table D-17. The pair wise comparisons show that 
there were eight combinations that had statistically significant results at a: 
95% confidence factor. sfPortscan off, Frag2 off, Telnet_negotiation on, and 
Http_inspect off compared to sfPortscan off, Frag2 off, Telnet_negotiation on, 
and Http_inspect on had a p-value of 0.0350. sfPortscan on, Frag2 on, 
Telnet_negotiation off, and Http_inspect off compared to sf Portscan on, ~rag2 
' 
on, Telnet_negotiation off, and Http_inspect on had a p-value of 0.0038. 
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sfPortscan off, Frag2 on, Telnet_negotiation off, and Http_inspect off 
compared to sfPortscan off, Frag2 on, Telnet_negotiation on, and 
Http_inspect off had a p-value of 0.0084. sf Portscan on, Frag2 on, 
Telnet_negotiation off, and Http_inspect off compared to sfPortscan on, Frag2 
on, Telnet_negotiation on, and Http_inspect off had a p-value of 0.0407. 
sfPortscan on, Frag2 off, Telnet_negotiation off, and Http_inspect off 
compared to sfPortscan on, Frag2 off, Telnet_negotiation on, and 
Http_inspect off had a p-value of 0.0305. sfPortscan on, Frag2 on, 
TelneLnegotiation off, and Http_inspect on compared to sfPortscan on, Frag2 
on, Telnet_negotiation on, and Http_inspect on had a p-value of 0.0209. 
sfPortscan off, Frag2 off, Telnet_negotiation off, and Http_inspect off 
compared to sfPortscan off, Frag2 on, Telnet_negotiation off, and 
Http_inspect off had a p-value of 0.0196. sfPortscan on, Frag2 off, 
Telnet_negotiation off, and Http_inspect on compared to sf Portscan on, Frag2 
on, Telnet_negotiation off, and Http_inspect on had a p-value of 0.0450. 
These comparisons had multiple sub-factor comparisons showing 
significance with the details listed in Table D-17. The greatest effect of this 
' 
treatment factor combination is the interaction of Telnet_negotiation and 
Http_inspect with some limited influence from the Frag2 pre-processor. 
Next, a look at the practical significance of the end-to-end delay 
introduced by the lnline Intrusion Detection System will be made. This will be 
' 
determined by looking at the per-packet delay. This information is shown in 
' 
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Table C-6 (Appendix C). The delays calculated will be compared to the 
information in Table A-1 (Appendix A) to see if any treatment factor 
combination will generate a per packet delay greater than 150 ms. Using the 
information in Table C-6 gives us the treatment factor combination that 
provided the largest per packet delay increase. This treatment factor is 
Flow&Stream4& Telnet_negotiation&Http_inspect, which had an increase in 
per packet delay of 0.001637114 seconds or 1.637114 ms. This increas~ is 
I 
well below the 150 ms mark for acceptable delay in end-to-end traffic and all 
other treatment factor combinations provide even smaller per packet 
increases. The smallest increase in per packet delay of 1.637112 ms came 




SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
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The data has been collected, the analysis has been done, and the 
answers to the research questions should now be available. To begin with, 
data has been gathered on end-to-end delay from eight different repetitions of 
each treatment factor. Averaging this information allowed a determinatior, of 
how much end-to-end delay is introduced by each individual treatment factor 
combination. This information provided a very good idea of how an inline 
intrusion detection system will perform. 
Next, the gathered data mean values were compared to the elapsed 
time of the original packet capture to determine which processing options 
introduced the largest amount of end-to-end delay. 
Finally, this gathered data was analyzed through an analysis of 
variance methodology to determine which configuration options of Snort 
introduced the largest amount of delay. The analysis of variance performed 
gave indication that 8 treatment factor combinations provided statistically I 
significant results. These 8 combinations were then analyzed using a Tukey-
Kramer method to gain some insight into what specific combinations 
generated the indication of significance from the analysis of variance. In 
conjunction with this, the data was also broken down into a per packet delay 
I 
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to look at the practical significance of each treatment factor combination. 
Even though the analysis of variance gave indication of statistically significant 
I 
results, none of the treatment factor combinations gave indication of havi~g 
any practical significance on end-to-end delay. 
CONCLUSIONS MADE 
Through the methodology followed, data has been obtained so that 
answers to the research questions can be determined. Question 1 asks how 
much end-to-end delay is introduced by the implementation of an inline 
intrusion detection system. Using the Snort inline intrusion detection system 
and considering the many various combinations of options and configurations 
the amount of end-to-end delay will range from 1.913 ms to 1.35 ms. This is 
a very small increase in relative terms and would be very difficult to notice in a 
normal operating environment. The null hypothesis for this situation was that 
the increase would not be noticeable. Considering this, the conclusion is to 
fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
Question 2 asked which processing options in Snort would introduce 
the most delay. This question is easily answered by simply looking at the 
amount of delay introduced by each treatment factor option and finding the 
option with the largest delay. This option was running Snort with the Flow, 
Stream4, Telnet_negotiation, and Http_inspect pre-processor turned on while 
Frag2 and sfPortscan pre-processors are turned off. The null hypothesislfor 
this question was that a treatment factor combination including the Flow or 
I 
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Stream4 or a combination with both pre-processors turned on would generate 
the most end-to-end delay. For this question, the conclusion is to again, jfail 
to reject the null hypothesis. The nature of the Flow and Stream4 pre-
processors make them system resource intensive and thus generate longer 
delays. 
Question 3 then asked which treatment factor would introduce a 
statistically or practically significant delay. This analysis indicated that th!! 
' 
overall model was significant by calculating a significance factor of 0.034. 
The analysis of variance performed provided eight treatment factor 
combinations that provided statistically significant results. These eight 
combinations with individual significance factors are: 
sfPortscan & Stream4 0.042 
Stream4 & Frag2 0.017 
Frag2 & Telnet_negotiation 0.037 
Flow & sfPortscan & Http_inspect 0.037 
Flow & Stream4 & Frag2 & Http_inspect 0.009 
sfPortscan & Stream4 & Frag2 & Http_inspect 0.019 
Telnet_negotiation & Http_inspect 0.001 
sfPortscan & Frag2 & Telnet_negotiation & Http_inspect 0.035 
In addition to these eight statistically significant treatment combinations, the 
overall model indicated that there are significant differences between the, 
different treatment factors in general. All of these results are processed with 
a confidence interval of 95%. The treatment factors of Flow&Stream4&Frag2 
&Http_inspect and Telnet_negotiation&Http_inspect thus appear to be the two 
treatment factor combinations that produce the most statistically significaht 
I 
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results because their respective significance factors are lowest. Thus, these 
two treatment factor combinations would still be statistically significant if the 
significance level was decreased to 1 %. 
The null hypothesis for the question of statistical significance was that 
the statistically significant treatment factors would have Flow and Stream4 
turned on and the alternative hypothesis would have the Flow and Stream4 
turned off. The results associated with this hypothesis are mixed. Five of.the 
eight significant treatment factors combinations include either Stream4 or 
Flow turned on. Both Stream4 and Flow are resource intensive in operational 
nature and thus appear to create a statistically significant increase in the end-
to-end delay at the 5% significance level. Since our overall model indicates 
statistically significant results, the conclusion is to reject the null hypothesis 
for statistical significance. 
A common factor in the remaining three treatment factors is the 
inclusion of the Telnet_negotiation pre-processor being turned on. This pre-
processor normalizes telnet traffic as well as ftp traffic and a brief analysis of 
the traffic capture used shows that a large portion of the traffic was either 
telnet or ftp. The packet capture contained 240, 142 packets. 120,809 of 
these packets contained either telnet or ftp data. This is approximately 50% 
of the total traffic processed. The large volume of telnet and ftp traffic caused 
a higher processing load on this pre-processor when it was turned on. This 
I 
higher load took longer to process creating a longer end-to-end delay. 
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The final item to be studied was that of the practical effects of an inline 
intrusion detection system. From the analysis and data gathered, the hig~est 
per packet delay achieved was with the treatment factor of Flow&Stream4'& 
Telnet_negotiation&Http_inspect. This treatment factor achieved a per 
packet delay of 1.637114 ms. The null hypothesis for this portion of the study 
stated that the per packet delay would be less than 150 ms. It is clear that 
the per packet delay is considerably less than the 150 ms, which means t~at 
there is no practical significance added to the end-to-end delay. The 
conclusion is to fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
Overall, there is a good indication that the Snort inline intrusion 
detection system is capable of carrying the load of a production network with 
minimal statistical impact and virtually no practical impact. This is an 
unexpected result as much larger delays were thought to be introduced by the 
inline intrusion detection system associated with a much wider variance 
between treatment factors. The Snort pre-processors obviously require 
processing cycles to complete their work, which in theory should increase ~he 
end-to-end delay of network traffic. However, the pre-processors save 
processor cycles by reducing the amount of traffic that must pass through the 
pattern matching engine, offsetting the increased processing cycles, creating 
a very operationally efficient security tool. 
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FUTURE EXTENSIONS TO RESEARCH 
While the results from this study are quite interesting and provide some 
useful information on the performance of the Snort in line intrusion detection 
system, the results also raise some additional questions. Some of the 
interactions between Flow and Stream4 suggest that the placement order in 
the configuration file used by Snort may have an effect on the delay 
introduced. A couple of the treatment factor combinations show that Flow' 
had the greatest effect, but appeared to provide an increase in variance when 
combined with Stream4. A research question arising from these results is: 
would Stream4 have the greatest effect and then provide an increase in 
variance when combined with Flow if the listing order was reversed in the 
configuration file? 
Now that Snort has been proven (from a processing capability 
viewpoint) to be almost invisible in a processing system, would such a system 
still be able to maintain the performance, while also efficiently and accurately 
detecting intrusions, malware, and other malicious network activities? Thi~ 
' 
would require network traffic containing known attacks and malicious traffic, 
I 
which is quite difficult to obtain and verify prior to use. 
This study allowed Snort to use the basic logging system to track the 
alerts and detection reports. Such logs are quite difficult to peruse and 
analyze and can be very time consuming. Snort provides several more u~er-
, 
friendly options for logging of the engine alerts. However, when using these 
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advanced options, how will they affect the processing performance as well as 
' ' 
the detection abilities of the Snort system? 
These are all topics to be considered in future research projects. E,ach 
provides specific questions that could be answered following a similar 
methodology used for this study. The answers obtained would continue tci 
' 
provide useful information on the abilities of Snort lnline to add another layer 
of security to existing networks in continuing attempts to protect and 
safeguard both the network infrastructure and data passing across it. 
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APPENDIX A 
Delay Specifications & Design of Experiment 
58 
Table A-1 - Delay Specifications (Cisco, 2007). 
Range In Milliseconds Description 
0-150 ms Acceptable for most user applications. 
150-400ms Acceptable provided that administrators are aware1of the 
transmission time and the impact it has on th~ 
transmission aualifv of user acclica.tions. 
Above400ms Unacceptable for general network planning purposes. 
However, it is recognized that in some exceptional cases 
this limit is exceeded. 
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Table A-2 - Experimental Design 
Run Factors A B C D E F Final Treatment 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 No Treatment 
2 X 0 0 0 0 0 A 
I 
3 0 X 0 0 0 0 B 
4 X X 0 0 0 0 AB 
5 0 0 X 0 0 0 C 
6 X 0 X 0 0 0 AC 
7 0 X X 0 0 0 BC 
8 X X X 0 0 0 ABC 
9 0 0 0 X 0 0 D 
10 X 0 0 X 0 0 AD 
11 0 X 0 X 0 0 BD 
12 X X 0 X 0 0 ABO 
13 0 0 X X 0 0 CD 
14 X 0 X X 0 0 ACD 
15 0 X X X 0 0 BCD 
16 X X X X 0 0 ABCD 
17 0 0 0 0 X 0 E 
18 X 0 0 0 X 0 AE 
19 0 X 0 0 X 0 BE 
20 X X 0 0 X 0 ABE 
21 0 0 X 0 X 0 CE 
22 X 0 X 0 X 0 ACE 
23 0 X X 0 X 0 BCE 
24 X X X 0 X 0 ABCE 
25 0 0 0 X X 0 DE 
26 X 0 0 X X 0 ADE 
27 0 X 0 X X 0 BOE 
28 X X 0 X X 0 ABDE 
29 0 0 X X X 0 COE 
30 X 0 X X X 0 ACDE I 
31 0 X X X X 0 BCDE 
32 X X X X X 0 ABCDE 
33 0 0 0 0 0 X F 
34 X 0 0 0 0 X AF 
35 0 X 0 0 0 X BF 
36 X X 0 0 0 X ABF 
37 0 0 X 0 0 X CF 
38 X 0 X 0 0 X ACF 
39 0 X X 0 0 X BCF 
40 X X X 0 0 X ABCF 
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Table A-2 - Experimental Design (cont.) 
Run Factors A B C D E F Final Treatment 
41 0 0 0 X 0 X DF 
42 X 0 0 X 0 X ADF 
43 0 X 0 X 0 X BDF 
44 X X 0 X 0 X ABDF 
45 0 0 X X 0 X CDF 
46 X 0 X X 0 X ACDF 
47 0 X X X 0 X BCDF 
48 X X X X 0 X ABCDF 
49 0 0 0 0 X X EF 
50 X 0 0 0 X X AEF 
51 0 X 0 0 X X BEF 
52 X X 0 0 X X ABEF 
53 0 0 X 0 X X CEF 
54 X 0 X 0 X X ACEF 
55 0 X X 0 X X BCEF 
56 X X X 0 X X ABCEF 
57 0 0 0 X X X DEF 
58 X 0 0 X X X ADEF 
59 0 X 0 X X X BDEF 
60 X X 0 X X X ABDEF 
61 0 0 X X X X CDEF 
62 X 0 X X X X ACDEF 
63 0 X X X X X BCDEF 
64 X X X X X X ABCDEF 
A-Flow 




F - Http_inspect 
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APPENDIX B 
SPSS Software Configuration 
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Figure 8-4 - SPSS Univariate Factor Configurations 
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Figure B-5 - SPSS Univariate Model Configuration 
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Figure 8-6 - SPSS Univariate Options Configuration 
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Figure B-7 - SPSS Univariate Options Configuration 
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Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages 
Treatment Run Observation Added DelaJl Average 







393.140038 0.002101 393.139501 , 







393.139467 0.001530 393.139375 I 







393.139602 0.001665 393.139683 







393.139765 0.001828 393.139806 : 
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Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages (cont.) 







393.140096 0.002159 393.139693 







393.139258 0.001321 393.139336 , 







393.139476 0.001539 393.139369 







393.139667 0.001730 393.139525 







393.139766 : 393.139813 0.001876 
+ 
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Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages (cont.) 







393.139543 0.001606 393.139589 







393.139207 0.001270 393.139635 







393.139984 0.002047 393.139530 







393.139648 0.001711 393.139626 







393.139741 0.001804 393.139699 · 
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Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages (cont.) 







393.114004 -0.023933 393.136573 







393.140183 0.002246 393.139836 







393.139604 0.001667 393.139390 







393.139517 0.001580 393.139430 







393.139948 0.002011 393.139634 
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Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages (cont.) 







393.140398 0.002461 393.139709 







393.140108 0.002171 393.139711 







393.139657 0.001720 393.139435 







393.139539 0.001602 393.139587 







393.139468 0.001531 393.139618 
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Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages (cont.) 







393.139125 0.001188 393.139473 







393.139177 0.001240 393.139377 







393.139548 0.001611 393.139557 







393.139619 0.001682 393.139382 







393.139487 0.001550 393.139473 
Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages (cont.) 







393.139346 0.001409 393.139515 







393.139373 0.001436 393.139333 







393.139617 0.001680 393.139706 







393.139650 0.001713 393.139412 







393.139469 0.001532 393.139489 
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Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages (cont.) 







393.139174 0.001237 393.139683 







393.139827 0.001890 393.139598 







393.139227 0.001290 393.139420 







393.139792 0.001855 393.139638 







393.139165 0.001228 393.139531 
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Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages (cont.) 







393.139982 0.002045 393.139564 







393.139910 0.001973 393.139439 







393.139541 0.001604 393.139536 







393.139369 0.001432 393.139433 







393.139135 0.001198 393.139337 
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Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages (cont.) 







393.139795 0.001858 393.139802 







393.139504 0.001567 393.139678 







393.140010 0.002073 393.139560 







393.139692 0.001755 393.139287 







393.139753 0.001816 393.139746 
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Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages (cont.) 







393.140242 0.002305 393.139730 







393.140094 0.002157 393.139850 







393.139746 0.001809 393.139651 







393.139771 0.001834 393.139591 







393.139081 0.001144 393.139587 
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Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages (cont.) 







393.139853 0.001916 393.139501 







393.139895 0.001958 393.139715 







393.139330 0.001393 393.139363 







393.138945 0.001008 393.139457 







393.139952 0.002015 393.139831 
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Table C-3 - Experimental Design Observations and Averages (cont.) 







393.139533 0.001596 393.139681 







393.139932 0.001995 393.139658 







393.139316 0.001379 393.139576 






393.139412 0.001475 I 
393.139672 0.001735 393.139636 i 







393.139538 0.001601 393.139720 i 
All Observations 393.1395251 
80 
Table C-4 - End-to-end Delay Introduced by IDS Engine 
Factor A - Flow 
Factor B - sf Portscan 
Factor C - Stream4 
Factor D - Frag2 
Factor E- Telnet_Decode 
Factor F - Http_inspect 
Source Average Time Original Cai;iture Time Introduced 
None 393.139501 393.137937 0.001564 
A 393.139375 393.137937 0.001438 
B 393.139683 393.137937 0.001746 
C 393.139806 393.137937 0.001869 
D 393.139693 393.137937 0.001756 
E 393.139336 393.137937 0.001399 
F 393.139369 393.137937 0.001432 
A*B 393.139525 393.137937 0.001588 
A*C 393.139766 393.137937 0.001829 
A*D 393.139589 393.137937 0.001652 
A*E 393.139635 393.137937 0.001698 
A*F 393.139530 393.137937 0.001593 
B*C 393.139626 393.137937 0.001689 
B*D 393.139699 393.137937 0.001762 
B*E 393.139823 393.137937 0.001886 
B*F 393.139836 393.137937 0.001899 
C*D 393.139390 393.137937 0.001453 
C*E 393.139430 393.137937 0.001493 
C*F 393.139634 393.137937 0.001697 
D*E 393.139709 393.137937 0.001772 
D*F 393.139711 393.137937 0.001774 
E*F 393.139435 393.137937 0.001498 
A*B*C 393.139587 393.137937 0.001650 
A*B*D 393.139618 393.137937 0.001681 
A*B*E 393.139473 393.137937 0.001535 
A*B*F 393.139377 393.137937 0.001440 
A*C*D 393.139557 393.137937 0.001620 
A*C*E 393.139382 393.137937 0.001445 
A*C*F 393.139473 393.137937 0.001536 
A*D*E 393.139515 393.137937 0.0015n 
A*D*F 393.139333 393.137937 0.001396 
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Table C-4 - End-to-end Delay Introduced by IDS Engine (cont.) 
A*E*F 393.139706 393.137937 0.001769 
B*C*D 393.~39412 393.137937 0.001475 
B*C*E 393.139489 393.137937 0.001552 
B*C*F 393.139683 393.137937 0.001746 
B*D*E 393.139598 393.137937 0.001661 
B*D*F 393.139420 393.137937 0.001483 
B*E*F 393.139638 393.137937 0.001701 
C*D*E 393.139531 393.137937 0.001594 
C*D*F 393.139564 393.137937 0.001627 
C*E*F 393.139439 393.137937 0.001502 
D*E*F 393.139536 393.137937 0.001599 
A*B*C*D 393.139433 393.137937 0.001495 
A*B*C*E 393.139337 393.137937 0.001400 
A*B*C*F 393.139802 393.137937 0.001865 
A*B*D*E 393.139678 393.137937 0.001741 
A*B*D*F 393.139560 393.137937 0.001623 
A*B*E*F 393.139287 393.137937 0.001350 
A*C*D*E 393.139746 393.137937 0.001809 
A*C*D*F 393.139730 393.137937 0.001792 
A*C*E*F 393.139850 393.137937 0.001913 
A*D*E*F 393.139651 393.137937 0.001714 
B*C*D*E 393.139591 393.137937 0.001654 
B*C*D*F 393.139587 393.137937 0.001650 
B*C*E*F 393.139501 393.137937 0.001564 
B*D*E*F 393.139715 393.137937 0.001778 
C*D*E*F 393.139363 393.137937 0.001425 
A*B*C*D*E 393.139457 393.137937 0.001520 
A*B*C*D*F 393.139831 393.137937 0.001894 
A*B*C*E*F 393.139681 393.137937 0.001744 
A*B*D*E*F 393.139658 393.137937 0.001721 
A*C*D*E*F 393.139576 393.137937 0.001638 
B*C*D*E*F 393.139636 393.137937 0.001699 
A*B*C*D*E*F 393.139720 393.137937 0.001783 
Average 393.139575 393.137937 0.001638 
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Table C-5 - End-to-end Delay Introduced by IDS Engine sorted by delay 
I 
Factor A - Flow 
Factor B - sf Portscan 
Factor C - Stream4 
Factor D - Frag2 
Factor E- Telnet_Decode 
Factor F - Http_inspect 
Source Average Time Original Cagture Time lntrodu'ced 
A*C*E*F 393.139850 393.137937 0.001913 I 
B*F 393.139836 393.137937 0.001899 
A*B*C*D*F 393.139831 393.137937 0.001894 
B*E 393.139823 393.137937 0.001886 
C 393.139806 393.137937 0.001869 
A*B*C*F 393.139802 393.137937 0.001865 
A*C 393.139766 393.137937 0.001829 
A*C*D*E 393.139746 393.137937 0.001809 
A*C*D*F 393.139730 393.137937 0.001792 
A*B*C*D*E*F 393.139720 393.137937 0.001783 
B*D*E*F 393.139715 393.137937 0.001778 
D*F 393.139711 393.137937 0.001774 
D*E 393.139709 393.137937 0.001772 
A*E*F 393.139706 393.137937 0.001769 
B*D 393.139699 393.137937 0.001762 
D 393.139693 393.137937 0.001756 
B 393.139683 393.137937 0.001746 
B*C*F 393.139683 393.137937 0.001746 
A*B*C*E*F 393.139681 393.137937 0.001744 
A*B*D*E 393.139678 393.137937 0.001741 
A*B*D*E*F 393.139658 393.137937 0.001721 
A*D*E*F 393.139651 393.137937 0.001714 
B*E*F 393.139638 393.137937 0.001701 
B*C*D*E*F 393.139636 393.137937 0.001699 
A*E 393.139635 393.137937 0.001698 
C*F 393.139634 393.137937 0.001697 
B*C 393.139626 393.137937 0.001689 
A*B*D 393.139618 393.137937 0.001681 
B*D*E 393.139598 393.137937 0.001661 
B*C*D*E 393.139591 393.137937 0.001654 
A*D 393.139589 393.137937 0.001652 
B*C*D*F 393.139587 393.137937 0.001650 
A*B*C 393.139587 393.137937 0.001650 
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Table C-5 - End-to-end Delay Introduced by IDS sorted by delay (co"'t.) 
A*C*D*E*F 393.139576 393.137937 0.001638 
C*D*F 393.139564 393.137937 0.001627 
A*B*D*F 393.139560 393.137937 0.001623 
A*C*D 393.139557 393.137937 0.001620 
D*E*F 393.139536 393.137937 0.001599 
C*D*E 393.139531 393.137937 0.001594 
A*F 393.139530 393.137937 0.001593 
A*B 393.139525 393.137937 0.001588 
A*D*E 393.139515 393.137937 0.001577 
None 393.139501 393.137937 0.001564 
B*C*E*F 393.139501 393.137937 0.001564 
B*C*E 393.139489 393.137937 0.001552 
A*C*F 393.139473 393.137937 0.001536 
A*B*E 393.139473 393.137937 0.001535 
A*B*C*D*E 393.139457 393.137937 0.001520 
C*E*F 393.139439 393.137937 0.001502 
E*F 393.139435 393.137937 0.001498 
A*B*C*D 393.139433 393.137937 0.001495 
C*E 393.139430 393.137937 0.001493 
B*D*F 393.139420 393.137937 0.001483 
B*C*D 393.139412 393.137937 0.001475 
C*D 393.139390 393.137937 0.001453 
A*C*E 393.139382 393.137937 0.001445 
A*B*F 393.139377 393.137937 0.001440 
A 393.139375 393.137937 0.001438 
F 393.139369 393.137937 0.001432 
C*D*E*F 393.139363 393.137937 0.001425 
A*B*C*E 393.139337 393.137937 0.001400 
E 393.139336 393.137937 0.001399 
A*D*F 393.139333 393.137937 0.001396 
A*B*E*F 393.139287 393.137937 0.001350 
Table C-6 - End-to-end Delay Introduced by IDS Engine 
Factor A - Flow 
Factor B - sf Portscan 
Factor C - Stream4 
Factor D - Frag2 
Factor E-Telnet_Decode 











































































































































Table C-6 - End-to-end Delay Introduced by IDS Engine (cont.) 
B*C*E 393.139489 240142 0.0016371126 
B*C*F 393.139683 240142 0.0016371134 
B*D*E 393.139598 240142 0.0016371130 
B*D*F 393.139420 240142 0.0016371123 
B*E*F 393.139638 240142 0.0016371132 
C*D*E 393.139531 240142 0.0016371128 
C*D*F 393.139564 240142 0.0016371129 
C*E*F 393.139439 240142 0.0016371124 
D*E*F 393.139536 240142 0.0016371128 
A*B*C*D 393.139433 240142 0.0016371123 
A*B*C*E 393.139337 240142 0.0016371119 
A*B*C*F 393.139802 240142 0.0016371139 
A*B*D*E 393.139678 240142 0.0016371134 
A*B*D*F 393.139560 240142 0.0016371129 
A*B*E*F 393.139287 240142 0.0016371117 
A*C*D*E 393.139746 240142 0.0016371136 
A*C*D*F 393.139730 240142 0.0016371136 
A*C*E*F 393.139850 240142 0.0016371141 
A*D*E*F 393.139651 240142 0.0016371133 
B*C*D*E 393.139591 240142 0.0016371130 
B*C*D*F 393.139587 240142 0.0016371130 
B*C*E*F 393.139501 240142 0.0016371126 
B*D*E*F 393.139715 240142 0.0016371135 
C*D*E*F 393.139363 240142 0.0016371121 
A*B*C*D*E 393.139457 240142 0.0016371124 
A*B*C*D*F 393.139831 240142 0.0016371140 
A*B*C*E*F 393.139681 240142 0.0016371134 
A*B*D*E*F 393.139658 240142 0.0016371133 
A*C*D*E*F 393.139576 240142 0.0016371129 
B*C*D*E*F 393.139636 240142 0.0016371132 
A*B*C*D*E*F 393.139720 240142 0.0016371135 
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APPENDIX D 
SPSS & Tukey-Kramer Analysis 
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Table D• 7 - SPSS ANOVA Results 
D eoen ent an e: 1 erence d V 'abl D'ff 
' Type Ill Sum of Partial Eta 
Source Sauares di Mean Sauare F Sia. , Sauared 
Corrected Model 1.08E-005{a) 62 1.74E-007 1.386 .034 .161 
Intercept .001 1 .001 10929.980 .000 .961 
Flow 4.47E-008 1 4.47E-008 .356 .551 .001 
sfPortscan 4.06E-007 1 4.06E-007 3.226 .073 .007 
Stream4 5.73E-008 1 5.73E-008 .455 .500 .001 
Frag2 4.64E-009 1 4.64E-009 .037 .848 .000 
Telnet_negotiation 2.22E-008 1 2.22E-008 .176 .675 .000 
Http_inspect 4.19E-008 1 4.19E-008 .333 .564 .001 
Flow • sfPortscan 5.01E-008 1 5.01 E-008 .398 .528 .001 
Flow • Stream4 8.80E-008 1 8.80E-008 .700 .403 .002 
sfPortscan • 
5.25E-007 1 5.25E-007 4.179 .042 .009 
Stream4 
Flow • sfPortscan • 
Stream4 3.39E-007 1 3.39E-007 2.697 .101 .006 
Flow• Frag2 2.07E-008 1 2.07E-008 .165 .685 .000 
sfPortscan • Frag2 2.06E-007 1 2.06E-007 1.635 .202 .004 
Flow • sfPortscan • 
1.12E-007 1 1.12E-007 .893 .345 .002 
Frag2 
Stream4 • Frag2 7.24E-007 1 7.24E-007 5.761 .017 .013 
Flow • Stream4 • 
4.27E-008 1 4.27E-008 .340 .560 .001 
Frag2 
sf Portscan • 
Stream4 • Frag2 1.33E-007 1 1.33E-007 1.056 .305 .002 
Flow • sf Portscan • 
Stream4 • Frag2 4.09E-009 1 4.09E-009 .033 .857 .000 
Flow• 
3.26E-008 1 3.26E-008 .259 .611 .001 
Telnet_negotiation 
sfPortscan • 
Telnet_negotiation 2.46E-007 1 2.46E-007 1.961 .162 .004 
Flow • sf Portscan • 
2.70E-008 1 2.70E-008 .214 .643 .000 Telnet_negotiation 
Stream4 • 
2.81E-008 1 2.81 E-008 .224 .637 .000 Telnet_negotiation 
Flow • Stream4 • 
7.48E-008 1 7.48E-008 .595 .441 .001 Telnet_negotiation 
sf Portscan • 
Stream4 • .000 1 .000 .000 1.000 .000 
Telnet_negotiation 
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Flow • sfPortscan • 
Stream4 • 2.26E-007 2.26E-007 1.795 .181 .004 
Telnet_negotiation 
Frag2 • 
5.51 E-007 5.51E-007 4.383 .037 .010 Telnet_negotiation 
Flow • Frag2 • 
9.13E-008 9.13E-008 .726 .395 .002 Telnet_negotiation 
s!Portscan • Frag2 • 
4.51 E-007 4.51E-007 3.588 .059 Telnet_negotiation .008 
Flow * sf Portscan * 
Frag2 • 3.66E-008 3.66E-008 .291 .590 .001 
Telnet_negotiation 
Stream4 • Frag2 • 
4.93E-008 4.93E-008 .392 .532 Telnet_negotiation .001 
Flow • Stream4 • 
Frag2 • 7.35E-008 1 7.35E-008 .585 .445 .001 
Telnet_negotiation 
sf Portscan • 
Stream4 • Frag2 • 2.26E-007 1 2.26E-007 1.796 .181 .004 
Telnet_negotiation 
Flow• s!Portscan • 
Stream4 • Frag2 • 2.87E-008 1 2.87E-008 .229 .633 .001 
Telnet_negotiation 
Flow• Http_inspect 3.72E-009 1 3.72E-009 .030 .864 .000 
sf Portscan • 9.87E-008 9.87E-008 .785 .376 .002 
Http_inspect 
Flow • s!Portscan • 
Http_inspect 5.51E-007 5.51E-007 4.380 .037 .010 
Stream4 • 5.98E-009 5.98E-009 .048 .827 .000 
Http_inspect 
Flow • Stream4 • 
Http_inspect 2.91E-009 2.91E-009 .023 .879 .000 
sf Portscan • 
Stream4 • 4.56E-008 4.56E-008 .363 .547 .001 
Http_inspect 
Flow• sfPortscan • 
Stream4 • .000 1 .000 .000 1.000 .000 
Http_inspect 
Frag2 • 
1.88E-007 1.88E-007 1.496 .222 .003 
Http_inspect 
Flow • Frag2 • 
1.17E-007 1 1.17E-007 .933 .334 .002 Http_inspect 
sf Portscan • Frag2 • 
9.13E-009 9.13E-009 .073 .788 .000 Http_inspect 
Flow • sf Portscan • 
Frag2 • 6.70E-008 6.70E-008 .533 .466 .001 
Http_inspect 
Stream4 • Frag2 • 
3.04E-008 3.04E-008 .242 .623 .001 Http_inspect 
Flow • Stream4 • 
8.73E-007 6.942 .009 .015 
Frag2 • 8.73E-007 
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Http_inspect 
sf Portscan • 
Stream4 • Frag2 • 7.00E-007 1 7.00E-007 5.564 .019 .012 
Http_inspect 
Flow • sf Portscan • 
Stream4 • Frag2 • 1.42E-008 1 1.42E-008 .113 .737 .000 
Hltp_inspect 
Telnet_negotiation • 
1.40E-006 1.40E-006 11.152 .001 .024 Http _inspect 
Flow* 
Telnet_negotiation • 1.29E-008 1.29E-008 .103 .749 ' .000 
Http_inspect 
sfPortscan * 
Telnet_negotiation • 1.79E-007 1.79E-007 1.426 .233 .003 
Http_inspect 
Flow * sf Portscan * 
Telnet_negotiation • 8.51E-008 8.51E-008 .677 .411 .002 
Http_inspect 
Stream4 • 
Telnet_negotiation • 2.06E-007 2.06E-007 1.640 .201 .004 
Http_inspect 
Flow • Stream4 • 
Telnet_negotiation • 2.74E-008 1 2.74E-008 .218 .641 .000 
Http_inspect 
sf Portscan • 
Stream4 • 
2.94E-008 1 2.94E-008 .234 .629 .001 
Telnet_negotiation • 
Http_inspect 
Flow • sf Portscan • 
Stream4 • 




Telnet_negotiation • 3.73E-007 3.73E-007 2.964 .086 .007 
Http_inspect 
Flow• Frag2 • 
Telnet_negotiation • 1.33E-008 1.33E-008 .106 .745 .000 
Http_inspect 
sfPortscan • Frag2 • 
Telnet_negotiation • 5.60E-007 1 5.60E-007 4.450 .035 .Q10 
Http_inspect 
Flow • sfPortscan • 
Frag2 • 7.51E-008 7.51E-008 .597 .440 .001 
Telnet_negotiation • 
Http_inspect 
Stream4 • Frag2 • 
Telnet_negotiation • 1.47E-007 1 1.47E-007 1.168 .280 .003 
Http_inspect 
Flow • Stream4 • 
Frag2 • 4.49E-009 4.49E-009 
Telnet_negotiation • 
.036 .850 .000 
Http_inspect 
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sf Portscan * 
Stream4 • Frag2 • 1.51 E-008 1 1.51 E-008 .120 .729 .000 
Telnet_negotiation • 
Http_inspect 
Error 5.65E-005 449 1.26E-007 
Total .001 512 
Corrected Total 6.73E-005 511 
a R Squared = .161 (AdJusted R Squared = .045) 
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Table D-8 - Statistically Significant Treatment Factors (cont.) 
Flow*Stream4*Frag2*Htto inspect I 
Flow Stream4 Fraa2 Http inspect Mean I 
I 
1 1 1 1 393.13955.19 
2 ' 393.1396727 
2 1 393.1396077 
2 393.1395164 
2 1 1 393.1395899 
2 393.1395106 
2 1 393.1395637 
2 393.1396642 
2 1 1 1 393.1395801 
2 393.1396167 
2 1 393.1394693 
2 393.1395030 
2 1 1 393.1394784 
2 393.1396261 





s!Portscan Stream4 Fraa2 Httn insoect Mean ' 
I 














2 1 ' 393.1395781 
2 393.1396785 
2 1 1 1 393.1397000 
2 393.1396954 
2 1 393.1395258 
2 393.1395705 
2 1 1 393.1395248 
2 393.1395f8 
2 1 393.1396146 
2 393.1395651 
93 
Table 8 (Cont.) - Statistically Significant Treatment Factors 
Telnet negotiation*Htto inspect I 
' Telnet neaotiation Httn insoect Mean ' 
1 1 393.13961°20 
2 393.1395254 




sfPortscan*Frag2*Telnet negotiation*Htto inspect 
sfPortscan Fraa2 Telnet neaotiation Httn insoect Mean 
1 1 1 1 393.1394764 
2 393.1394896 
2 1 393.1394913 
2 393.1396633 
2 1 1 393.1396700 
2 393.1396140 
2 1 393.1394~93 
2 393.13951,34 
2 1 1 1 393.1395957 
2 393.1395939 
2 1 393.1396370 
2 393.1396793 
2 1 1 ' 393.1397059 
2 393.1394041 
2 1 393.1394945 
2 393.1396Q85 
Table D-9 - Analysis of sf Portscan*Stream4 Interaction 




S = Stream4 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 













































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
DI 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 















Table D-10- Analysis of Stream4*Frag2 Interaction 





Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 


















1.65087 4 792 
0.543161752 








1 .65087 4 792 
0.20922159 
















Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P{T <=t) two-tail 















Table D-11 -Analysis of Frag2"Telnet_negotiation Interaction 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
DI 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 













































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
DI 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 
















Table D-12-Analysis of Flow*sfPortscan*Http_inspect Interaction 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
DI 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 
















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 



















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=1) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 



















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
DI 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 





























Table D-13-Analysis of Flow*Stream4*Frag2*Http_inspect lnteracti9n 




S = Stream4 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 
































H = Http_inspect 



















Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 













































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
DI 
t Stat 
P(T <=I) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 





















H=1, F-2, S-2, FR-1 
393.1394784 


























Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
FR=2, H=1, F=2, 8=1 FR=2, H=1, F=2, 8=2 I 












































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 
















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
DI 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 



























Table D-14- Analysis of sfPortscan*Stream4*Frag2*Http_inspect 
Interaction 
118 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Of 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=1) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=1) two-tail 













































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=1) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <,;t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 














































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 
















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 

















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 











































Table D-15 - Analysis of Telnet_negotiation*Http_inspect Interaction 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 

















































Hypothesized Mean Difference 
DI 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=I) two-tail 
















Table D-16-Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 
Http_inspect Interaction 
138 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=I) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=I) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 









































Table D-16-Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2*Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 












































Table D-16-Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2*Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Crttical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 











































Table D-16-Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 










































Table D-16- Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=1) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P{T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P{T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P{T <=t) two-tail 










































Table D-16-Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 















































Table D-16- Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2*Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 










































Table D-16- Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=1) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=1) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=1) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=1) two-tail 










































Table D-16-Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 









































Table D-16- Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 









































Table D-16- Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 










































Table D-16- Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 









































Table D-16-Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2*Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 
t Critical two-tail 
393.1396508 









































Table D-16- Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 









































Table D-16- Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2*Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=I) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 











































Table D-16-Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 









































Table D-16-Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=1) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 









































Table D-16 -Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2*Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 









































Table D-16-Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2*Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 










































Table D-16- Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
di 
t Stat 
P(T <=I) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
DI 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=I) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
DI 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 










































Table D-16-Analysis of sfPortscan*Frag2"Telnet_negotiation* 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 




Hypothesized Mean Difference 
Df 
t Stat 
P(T <=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T <=t) two-tail 










































Table D-17 - Summary of Statistically Significant Interactions 
Flow-F 
sf Portscan - P 
8tream4-8 
Frag2- FR 
Telnet_Decode - T 
Http_inspect - H 
Table Factor Combination 
Main Factor 8ub-factor1 
Table D-9 sfPortscan&8tream4 
8=1, P=1,2 
Table D-10 Frag2&8tream4 
FR=2, 8=1,2 
Table D-11 Frag2&Telnet_negotiation 
No significant interactions 
Table D-12 Flow&sfPortscan&Http_inspect 
H=1, F=2, P=1,2 
8ubfactor2 
Table D-13 Flow&8tream4&Frag2&Http_inspect 
H=1, FR=2, 8=2, F=1,2 
FR=2, H=1, F=2, 8=1,2 
Table D-14 sfPortscan&8tream4&Frag2&Http_inspect 
P=1, 8=1, FR=1, H=1,2 
H=1, P=2, 8=1, FR=1,2 
P=2, 8=1, FR=1,2 
FR=1, H=1, P=2, 8=1,2 
FR=1, P=2, 8=1,2 
FR=2, H=2, P=1, 8=1,2 
8=1, FR=1, H=1, P=1,2 
8=1, FR=1, P=1,2 
8=1, H=1, P=1,2 
































Table D-17 - Summary of Statistically Significant Interactions (cont.), 
Table Factor Combination 
Main Factor Sub-factor1 Subfactor2 




H=2, T =1,2 
Table D-16 sfPortscan&Frag2& Telnet_negotiation&Http_inspect 
P=1, FR=1, T=2, H=1,2 
P=2, FR=2, T =1, H=1,2 
P=2, T=1, H=1,2 
FR=2, T =1, H=1,2 
H=1, P=1, FR=2, T=1,2 
H=1, FR=2, T=1,2 
P=1, FR=2, T=1,2 
H=1, P=2, FR=2, T =1,2 
H=1, FR=2, T =1,2 
H=2, P=2, FR=1, T=1,2 
H=2, P=2, T =1,2 
H=2, FR=1, t=1,2 
H=2, P=2, FR=2, T =1,2 
H=2, P=2, T =1,2 
T=1, H=1, P=1, FR=1,2 
T=1, H=1, FR=1,2 
T=1, P=1, FR=1,2 
T =1, H=2, P=2, FR=1,2 
H=2, T=1,2 
H=2, T=1,2 
P-vah.Je 
I 
' ' 
0.00341 
0.00261 
0.0072 
0.0012, 
0.0350 
0.00381 
0.02351 
0.00341 
0.0140 1 
0.00341 
0.0084,1 
0.0011 
0.00721 
0.0136, 
0.04071 
0.0011 I 
0.00721 
0.0305 
0.0028, 
0.0012 
0.0440 
0.0012 
0.0209: 
0.00281 
0.0012I 
0.01961 
0.01441 
0.01471 
0.04501 
